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• This research focuses on how the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) is using various types of economic investment to gain 
strategic concessions from developing states. 
• There appears to be a dichotomous approach to the PRC’s 
investment strategy. On the one hand, they invest in stable, 
uncorrupt, democratic economies. On the other, the PRC 
chooses to invest in corrupt, instable, and autocratic 
economies.
• Prior to this research, the USG lacked the ability to develop 
indicator patterns that have substantive and statistical 
significance in predicting areas where the PRC will attempt to 
exploit investment to gain strategic concessions.
Investment vs Fragility
Economic Investment, Corruption, Fragility, 
and Democracy:
How the PRC leverages States’ pre-existing internal 
conditions to gain advantage.
Results
• The findings of this research show, with high levels of 
statistical significance, countries which meet specific 
criteria* will likely receive lower or higher investment 
from the PRC.
• The findings of this research support the claim that 
two general trends are emerging in how the PRC 
invests with the world:
1. The PRC invests with uncorrupt, un-indebted, 
wealthy, democratic countries within the bounds 
of international norms.
2. The PRC invests with vulnerable states in a 
different fashion. In countries that are corrupt, 
over-leveraged with debt, poor, and autocratic 
the PRC uses a different engagement strategy.
So What?
1. These findings allow U.S. foreign policy and national 
security decision-makers to assess the risk within 
individual nations that can be leveraged into making 
strategic concessions to the PRC. 
2. This checklist will help assess whether or not a given 
country is in a “high leverage” or “low leverage” 
situation relative to the PRC. 
3. Finally, these criteria illuminate specific areas within a 
country where the U.S. can focus efforts of support to 
counter PRC economic statecraft, also known as 
“debt-trap diplomacy.” 
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Investment vs Corruption and Debt
Research Question
• How does the PRC's use of economic investment exploit 
pre-existing levels of corruption, fragility, and freedom to 
gain strategic concessions?
Criteria Yes – Meets Criteria No – Does Not Meet 
Criteria 
1. Higher Corruption and 
Higher Debt-GDP Ratio 
  
2. Higher Fragility   
3. Higher Autocracy   
 
Criteria for Increased 
Investm nt
Research design
• This study developed four hypotheses to subject to 
quantitative testing. 
• This research then conducted a regression analysis of 
the PRC’s investment across the globe using the 
investment derived from the Chinese Global Investment 
Tracker (CGIT) as the dependent variable.
• The independent variables considered included 
corruption, fragility, democracy, debt, and wealth. 
Investment vs Polity (Democracy)
*For ease of understanding and maximum utility, we 
culled three criteria that serve as a checklist for the 
likelihood of investment by the PRC with the goal of 
gaining strategic concessions. 
